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Feminist scholarship has demonstrated the importance of sustained critical engagement 
with ultrasound visualizations of pregnant women’s bodies. in response to portrayals of 
these images as “objective” forms of knowledge about the fetus, it has drawn attention to 
the social practices through which the meanings of ultrasound are produced. This article 
makes a novel contribution to this project by addressing an empirical context that has been 
neglected in the existing feminist literature concerning ultrasound, namely, its use during 
pregnancies that women decide to terminate. Drawing on semi-structured interviews with 
women concerning their experiences of abortion in england, i explore how the meanings 
of having an ultrasound prior to terminating a pregnancy are discursively constructed. i 
argue that women’s accounts complicate dominant representations of ultrasound and that 
in so doing, they multiply the subject positions available to pregnant women.
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For several decades, feminist scholarship has mapped and decon-structed anti-abortion claims that ultrasound images of pregnancy 
provide “objective” evidence of fetal personhood (see, e.g., Condit 1990; 
Daniels 1993; Duden 1993; Hartouni 1997; Hopkins, Zeedyk, and Raitt 
2005; Petchesky 1987; Roberts 2012a; Science and Technology Subgroup 
1991; Sheldon 1997; Stabile 1998; Taylor 1998, 2008). By demonstrating 
the social practices through which the meanings of these images are con-
structed, such research disrupts anti-abortion claims that ultrasound can 
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be used “to see and know the truth from a single perspective” (Roberts 
2012a, 133 [emphasis in original]). This article contributes to this project 
by exploring the discursive practices through which women in England 
construct the experience of having an ultrasound prior to abortion. In 
addition to addressing a context of pregnant embodiment that has been 
neglected by empirical feminist research concerning ultrasound (Gerber 
2002; Kimport et al. 2012), it argues that engagement with this context 
offers novel opportunities to destabilize dominant representations of this 
sociotechnical practice.
DEcONSTRUcTING DOmINANT REpRESENTATIONS  
Of ULTRASOUND
Anti-abortion deployments of ultrasound imagery have been conceptu-
alized as part of a broader reframing of abortion as an object of medical, 
rather than religious, knowledge (Franklin 1991; Petchesky 1987). In 
England, Scotland, and Wales, medical expertise is made central to the 
regulation of abortion through the 1967 Abortion Act, as amended by the 
1990 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act. Two doctors must agree 
that the procedure is necessary on the grounds of a pregnant woman’s 
health or that of her fetus. These grounds become more limited beyond 24 
weeks’ gestation, which forms the upper time limit on most abortions. 
Doctors can legally interpret the clinical grounds for abortion very 
broadly (Sheldon 1997), and research suggests that in practice, abortion is 
generally conceptualized as a pregnant woman’s decision (Lee 2003). 
Nonetheless, feminist theorists critique the law’s construction of abortion 
as a deviant act that requires regulation by medical experts (Boyle 1997; 
Sheldon 1997). In addition to its problematic portrayal of women’s repro-
ductive decision making, this framework renders abortion provision vul-
nerable to challenge on the basis of claims concerning medical knowledge 
and practice (Science and Technology Subgroup 1991; Sheldon 1997).
In recent decades, this vulnerability has been underscored by repeated 
(albeit, to date, unsuccessful) anti-abortion campaigns. One such cam-
paign, which has focused on lowering the legal time limit on abortion, has 
used developments in ultrasound imaging to claim that the fetus is visibly 
“a person” at gestations below 24 weeks. As Palmer highlights, such argu-
ments depend upon the “conflation of seeing with knowing” (Palmer 
2009b, 174) and ignore non-visual forms of knowledge about pregnancy 
(i.e., a pregnant woman’s embodied knowledge of its social sustainability). 
They also imply that medical imaging technologies provide unmediated, 
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objective knowledge (Palmer 2009b; Roberts 2012a). Yet, as Petchesky 
(1987) demonstrates, images produced using ultrasound construct the fetus 
as an autonomous individual “dangling in space, without a woman’s uterus 
and body and bloodstream to support it” (Petchesky 1987, 63). In other 
words, this technology generates a particular visualization of pregnancy 
from which pregnant women are erased.
Hopkins, Zeedyk, and Raitt (2005) argue that in addition to deploying 
this “fetal-centred” (Steinberg 1991, 179) depiction of pregnancy, 
anti-abortion groups also use a particular (unacknowledged) vantage point 
to construct the meaning of viewing ultrasound images. Opponents of abor-
tion often draw on the accounts of “the willingly pregnant,” who describe 
ultrasound as a pivotal moment of emotional bonding during which the 
“personhood” of an eagerly anticipated fetus is made visible (Hopkins, 
Zeedyk, and Raitt 2005). Mobilizing the social construction of emotion “as 
‘unmediated’ and ‘authentic’” (Hopkins, Zeedyk, and Raitt 2005, 395), 
anti-abortion campaigners position such responses as objective evidence of 
fetal personhood and argue that if women requesting abortion were shown 
ultrasound images of their pregnancies, they would inevitably share this 
emotional response and be dissuaded from the procedure.
Hopkins, Zeedyk, and Raitt (2005) offer an important critique of 
anti-abortion attempts to define the meaning of all encounters with ultra-
sound using the accounts of women who plan to carry their pregnancies 
to term.1 Arguably, however, their analysis neglects a broader problem, 
namely, the limiting subject position that dominant depictions of ultra-
sound as a tool of “maternal-fetal bonding” construct for all pregnant 
women. Taylor (1998, 2008) traces the history of this depiction, connect-
ing it to early medical advocates of the technology who argued (on the 
basis of highly debatable evidence) that viewing ultrasound images would 
cause a woman to form an emotional “bond” with her fetus, producing 
better compliance with medical advice during prenatal care. Over time, 
this construction of ultrasound has become entrenched through prenatal 
care practices (Taylor 1998, 2008). Moreover, it has traveled beyond the 
clinic (e.g., in advertising and other forms of popular culture), to the 
extent that ultrasound is now understood as a joyful social rite of passage 
in the transition to contemporary Western motherhood (Roberts 2012a; 
Taylor 1998, 2008). As Roberts highlights, this narrow framing prevents 
the multiplicity of pregnant women’s encounters with ultrasound from 
being “voiced and acknowledged, including . . . unpleasurable or indiffer-
ent experiences of viewing ultrasound images” (2012a, 133).
In this article, I draw on these insights concerning the social construc-
tion of ultrasound to explore women’s interview accounts of encountering 
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the technology prior to abortion. I illustrate that women’s accounts are 
often oriented to constructions of ultrasound as a moment of joyful mater-
nal spectatorship of fetal personhood. However, I also suggest that they 
destabilize this dominant representation by offering alternative depictions 
of this sociotechnical practice.
Ultrasound in pregnancies That Women plan to carry to Term
A key way in which existing feminist research challenges dominant rep-
resentations of ultrasound is by exploring the contingencies of its use in 
pregnancies that women plan to carry to term. For example, Mitchell (2001) 
illustrates that far from being an unmediated event, women’s encounters 
with prenatal ultrasound in Canada are produced through their interactions 
with sonographers. These practitioners narrate the unintelligible two-
dimensional images on screen in a manner (e.g., describing the fetus as an 
individual with distinct personality traits) that enables women to construct 
an emotionally significant picture of “their baby” (Mitchell 2001).
In her analysis of prenatal ultrasound in the United States, Taylor 
(1998, 2008) draws attention to another contingency that is erased from 
anti-abortion portrayals of ultrasound as a tool of maternal-fetal bonding. 
She points out that women are offered the opportunity to meet and bond 
with their fetuses as part of the objectifying process of prenatal diagnosis, 
during which the fetus is subjected to “a critical scientific gaze that evalu-
ates its condition” (Taylor 1998, 24). Because few conditions diagnosed 
prenatally can be treated, the implicit function of this process is to enable 
women to terminate their pregnancies if “abnormalities” are discovered.
Taylor’s analysis suggests that in the United States, the practice of 
ultrasound centers on a “prenatal paradox” (Taylor 1998, 16) whereby the 
fetus is simultaneously objectified and personified as a separate individ-
ual. However, cross-culturally comparative research demonstrates that 
ultrasound is practiced very differently in other contexts. For example, 
Mitchell and Georges (1997) find that in Greece, ultrasound is provided 
with minimal narration and is framed primarily as a medical technology 
designed to detect fetal abnormalities. Other studies have similarly shown 
how different understandings of the processes via which personhood is 
produced, as well as the meaning of medical knowledge, create locally 
diverging prenatal “ultrasounds” (Gammeltoft 2007; Harris et al. 2004; 
Ivry 2006; Morgan 2000; Saetnan 2000).
Some authors have extended this form of analysis to alternative con-
texts of pregnant embodiment. Layne (2003) reflects on the implications 
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of prenatal ultrasound for women who go on to experience miscarriage, 
stillbirth, or neonatal death. Likewise, Rapp (2000) and Mitchell (2004) 
address women’s experiences of receiving a diagnosis of fetal abnormal-
ity during an ultrasound scan. In contrast, little is known about how expe-
riences of ultrasound are negotiated in the context of pregnancies that 
women decide to terminate (Gerber 2002; Kimport et al. 2012).
Ultrasound in pregnancies That Women Decide to Terminate
In England, ultrasound is a routine part of pre-abortion care. The Royal 
College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists’ (2011, 52) clinical guideline 
The Care of Women Requesting induced Abortion suggests that although 
it is no longer necessary, the routine use of pre-abortion ultrasound to 
confirm the gestation of a pregnancy became entrenched following the 
introduction of medical abortion (a procedure originally associated with a 
strict gestational time limit).
The guideline recommends that women should be asked whether they 
wish to view their ultrasound image (Royal College of Obstetricians and 
Gynaecologists 2011, 53). This recommendation is made on the basis of 
quantitative findings from studies in South Africa (Bamigboye et al. 2002) 
and Canada (Wiebe and Adams 2009) demonstrating that many2 women 
want to view their ultrasound images (although many do not), and that 
most who do describe this as a positive experience that does not alter their 
decision about abortion (see also Graham, Ankrett, and Killick 2010; 
Kimport et al. 2013). Related findings are highlighted in a qualitative 
study by Kimport et al. (2012), who explored women’s emotional reac-
tions to viewing their ultrasound image before abortion in the United 
States, and found that several women deliberately sought, and valued, this 
experience as part of the process of ending a pregnancy. As Kimport et al. 
(2012) note, such findings disrupt anti-abortion predictions about the 
impact of ultrasound on women seeking abortions.
However, while its findings challenge claims that ultrasound produces 
predictable responses in pregnant women, this small body of research is 
also limited in key respects. In investigating women’s “responses” to or 
“preferences” about ultrasound viewing, it constructs this process as an 
asocial encounter between an individual pregnant woman and a neutral 
image of her pregnancy, whose “impact” can be empirically determined. 
Notably, Kimport et al. do highlight the importance of understanding 
“how the context of . . . viewing may influence women’s interpretation of 
her ultrasound image” (Kimport et al. 2012, e516). Nevertheless, their 
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emphasis is on how the individual circumstances of pregnancy may alter 
the “effect” of ultrasound images. As with the other studies of pre-abortion 
ultrasound outlined above, their analysis does not consider how ultra-
sound images, and women’s encounters with them, are constituted through 
available social accounts of their meaning.
In contrast, this article takes as its point of departure the insight of 
feminist theorizations of ultrasound outlined above, namely that “the tech-
nological is profoundly social and political” (Taylor 2008, 25). Rather 
than asking how women “respond” to pre-abortion ultrasound, it explores 
the terms in which it is possible to make sense of, and represent, the mean-
ing of this sociotechnical practice.
mEThODS
The analysis presented here is drawn from 23 semi-structured inter-
views that were conducted as part of a broader study that explored wom-
en’s experiences of abortion in England. The research was approved by an 
NHS Research Ethics Committee and the University of York’s Economics, 
Law, Management, Politics and Sociology Ethics Committee.
I planned to recruit participants via clinics that provide abortion, with 
the study information being given to women on the day of their procedure, 
and interviews being conducted two to six weeks afterwards. However, 
because recruitment in this context proved very difficult, I also advertised 
for participants via newspapers and social media. These combined strate-
gies produced a sample of 28 women (17 of whom were recruited via 
clinics and 11 of whom were recruited via external ads). Of these partici-
pants, 23 described having an ultrasound as part of their experience of 
abortion; their accounts form the focus of this article. All participants 
were offered a gift of £20 to thank them for their time.
Interviews took place either by phone or face-to-face (depending on 
participants’ preferences) and were recorded and transcribed verbatim, 
except in one case where the recording device failed and detailed notes 
were written up immediately afterwards. Participants’ identities have been 
anonymized using interview numbers. This represents the balancing of my 
own (ongoing) concern about the ways that numbers disembody research 
participants, with the anxieties that many women expressed about the con-
cealment of their identities. Following these interviews, I decided that 
although unlikely, the consequences of inadvertently identifying a partici-
pant through using pseudonyms (e.g., if a woman had concealed her full 
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name from me) were too serious to risk. In future research, I would deal 
with this issue differently, by involving women in the process of anonymiz-
ing their identities (e.g., by asking them to choose a pseudonym).
Interviews drew on a topic guide that had been developed on the basis 
of existing literature concerning women’s experiences of abortion. I aimed 
to give participants the space to define the salient aspects of their experi-
ences by beginning with a very open-ended question: “Can you tell me a 
bit about what happened when you first thought that you might be preg-
nant?” In response, women typically provided long accounts, about which 
I then asked follow-up questions. In most interviews, women spontane-
ously described “having a scan” prior to abortion. After it became clear that 
this represented a significant part of women’s experiences, if accounts of 
ultrasound were not offered spontaneously during interviews, I began to 
ask women if they had received a scan and, if so, what this was like.
As anticipated in the ethical review of the study, a small minority of 
participants became distressed when talking about their experiences. If this 
happened, I made sure that they wanted to continue with the interview 
(which all participants did). At the end of the interview, I also checked that 
they were aware of potential support services available to them. Significantly, 
those who expressed distress highlighted the importance of being allowed 
to talk about emotionally upsetting, yet socially silenced, experiences.
In order to explore whether the study included participants with vary-
ing backgrounds, a short questionnaire was used to collect basic demo-
graphic information. Using British census categories, the majority of the 
participants identified as “White British/Other White background” (n=21). 
One participant identified as “Black/Black British–Caribbean,” and one 
identified as having a specific “Mixed background.” Participants were 
generally highly educated (most had, or were undertaking, undergraduate 
degrees). Women’s ages at the time of their abortions ranged from approx-
imately 17–36 years, and the gestation of their pregnancies ranged from 
approximately 5–22 weeks.
The time elapsed between participants’ abortions and their interviews 
ranged from approximately 3 weeks to 13 years. This means that those 
who took part in the study had very different opportunities to reflect upon 
their encounters with ultrasound prior to being interviewed. Additionally, 
it seems likely that the meaning of these experiences will have changed in 
relation to subsequent life events. Nonetheless, in terms of the analysis 
presented here, there were no discernible differences between the accounts 
of women for whom abortion was a relatively recent event and those for 
whom it had taken place many years previously.
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Most women described experiences of ultrasound within the context of 
pre-abortion care. However, four women also described having an ultra-
sound during prenatal care. In three cases, this was because they had 
originally planned to carry their pregnancies to term, but their circum-
stances changed during pregnancy (for one participant, this occurred 
when a lethal fetal condition was diagnosed during the scan). For one 
woman, participation in a prenatal scan was the result of pressure from her 
partner to keep her pregnancy, a situation that is explored further below.
The analysis that follows draws on Potter and Wetherell’s (1987) 
approach to discourse analysis in the sense that it explores the “interpreta-
tive repertoires” through which women construct their encounters with 
ultrasound prior to abortion. An interpretative repertoire, Potter and 
Wetherell suggest, is “a lexicon or register of terms and metaphors drawn 
upon to characterise and evaluate actions and events” (1987, 138). In 
identifying the interpretative repertoires that women draw upon to describe 
pre-abortion ultrasound, my aim is to understand what it “is possible to 
say” (Edley 2001, 201) about this experience.
A TEchNOLOGY Of SITUATED VISUAL RELATIONShIpS
As described above, dominant representations of ultrasound routinely 
position pregnant women as joyful maternal witnesses to visualizations of 
fetal personhood. Across many of the interviews, participants drew on 
elements of this depiction, in particular, the characterization of ultrasound 
as an emotionally significant visual encounter between a pregnant woman 
and her fetus. However, they also reworked and contested dominant rep-
resentations using (what I have termed) an interpretative repertoire of 
“situated visual relationships.” Through this repertoire, they emphasized 
various ways in which the process of viewing ultrasound is socially “situ-
ated” (Haraway 1988). In doing so, they contested the “conflation of see-
ing with knowing” (Palmer 2009b, 174) and also offered representations 
of ultrasound as something other than an experience of maternal-fetal 
bonding. Below, I provide examples of participants’ use of this repertoire.
Resisting the Script: Accounts of Deliberate Not-Looking
Many participants described the experience of having an ultrasound as 
one of trying to navigate and resist a rigid sociotechnical “script” (Akrich 
1994) that was incompatible with their own experiences of pregnancy:
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I purposely chose not to look . . . it was very much like I’m not looking. 
And they gave me the option. They asked, “Do you want to see?” And I 
was, like, “No.” The sensation of having the stuff put on you—the jelly—
it’s almost, like, the first time of, like, this is real. Because even though 
you’re not seeing the screen you’re imagining what it would look like. 
Because you’ve seen enough programmes of that. And I think it’s probably 
meant to be one of the most joyous things of looking at a screen and seeing 
your baby move. And I don’t know until I have my first child that’s wanted 
if that will have taken away from it or not. (Interview 15)
I remember not wanting to look at it or anything. . . . Because it does make 
it—if anything that probably did upset me, that bit, because I think—espe-
cially because my boyfriend had come with me and I think he came in the 
room as well and I thought this is a little bit like, you know, when you sort 
of are happy to be having one. And I think that bit did make me a bit 
uncomfortable with the whole thing. You know, with the decision. So, yeah, 
I didn’t sort of look at the screen . . . that bit [the ultrasound] probably did 
upset me the most because it’s exactly like you see on TV when people are, 
you know, happy to be having a baby. You go, don’t you, the jelly on your 
belly and then you’re like—so, yeah, that bit probably was the bit that made 
me think, ooh . . . because, like, you relate that as well from growing up, 
seeing happiness, don’t you, as well. I think that’s linked to people being 
really happy and you’re going to, you know [end the pregnancy]. . . . It’s 
never really—you never see people that are obviously not happy that they 
are [pregnant]. (Interview 21[italicized text in brackets is my annotation])
On the one hand, these accounts of how ultrasound is “meant to be” reify 
normative depictions of the technology as a tool of maternal-fetal bonding 
and position women’s encounters with it in the context of abortion care as 
deviant. On the other, by articulating a disjuncture between expectations 
and experiences of ultrasound, they situate encounters with this technol-
ogy in two key ways. First, in rejecting the act of looking at the viewing 
screen as inappropriate to their own pregnancies, these participants depict 
ultrasound as an affective experience that depends on social context. 
Joyful recognition of fetal personhood, they argue, is not intrinsic to the 
experience of having an ultrasound. Rather, the pursuit of joyful visual 
encounters with the fetus requires the context of a “wanted” pregnancy, in 
which women actively seek to construct and develop maternal-fetal rela-
tionships. Second, these participants construct experiences of ultrasound 
(whether “joyful” or “difficult”) as inseparable from dominant social 
representations of its meaning. Strikingly, although neither of the women 
quoted above looked at the viewing screen, both portray the experience 
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of having a scan as a process of “seeing” normative depictions of ultra-
sound in popular culture. This pattern was repeated across many of the 
interviews, where participants talked about the significance of feeling the 
ultrasound gel being placed on their abdomens, the setup of the room, the 
presence of their partners during the scan, the movements made by the 
sonographer, and the fact that looking at the screen was an ever-present 
possibility. Such practices were presented as synecdoches for a ritual 
affective experience central to popular cultural portrayals of pregnancy: 
the excitement and joy of “looking at a screen and seeing your (wanted) 
baby move.” Women often described their discomfort (and, in some cases, 
distress) at being drawn into this ritual through these practices, while 
simultaneously being excluded from it because of their feelings in relation 
to their own pregnancies. Their accounts are suggestive of the difficulties 
involved in trying to reject dominant depictions of ultrasound. Indeed, 
Interviewee 21 (above) comments explicitly on this issue, noting how on 
television ultrasound is “linked to being really happy” and there are no 
alternative representations of this practice.
Subverting the Script: Accounts of Deliberate (or Desired) Looking
In the accounts explored above, women reject the possibility of looking 
at the viewing screen as inappropriate to the context of their own pregnan-
cies. In contrast, other participants described ultrasound as a technology 
that can facilitate emotionally significant visual encounters with the fetus 
prior to abortion. Crucially, however, by constructing what it means to 
encounter the fetus using a repertoire of “situated visual relationships,” 
they challenged the limited subject position made available by anti-abortion 
depictions of this process.
One participant described ultrasound as a visual encounter that her 
partner was able to enlist against her in his attempt to persuade her to 
continue with her pregnancy. Although she knew that she wanted to 
request an abortion, he pressured her to delay this decision until after her 
first prenatal ultrasound, during which he encouraged her to watch the 
viewing screen:
I saw the baby sucking its thumb and saw it move. And I went into the scan 
hoping there was no heartbeat so that told me a lot as well. Because I 
thought if there’s no heartbeat at least then it’s nature taking its course 
rather than me having to do what I did. But no, he was, like, looking in awe 
at the screen and I was just looking away. And then he said, “Look, because 
that’s what we’re here for,” so I looked. And you get that feeling of, that’s 
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my baby, but at the same time you get that feeling of it just confirms what 
you already know. And I think he thought because of my maternal instinct 
. . . that as soon as I saw it and I saw it move and saw it on the screen and 
it became more real, I think he thought that that would just [flip] my mind 
but it didn’t. It kind of confirmed. Because if I could still think it when I 
saw what I saw, to me that says it was the right decision for me. (Interview 
3 [non-italicized text in brackets indicates unclear word(s)])
This extract vividly portrays the troubling implications of the “democra-
tization” (Sandelowski 1994, 242) facilitated by ultrasound. Studies of 
heterosexual couples’ experiences of ultrasound during prenatal care illus-
trate that this technology can facilitate men’s involvement in their part-
ner’s pregnancies (Draper 2002; Reed 2012; Sandelowski 1994). However, 
Sandelowski (1994) suggests that such involvement may be double-
edged; by facilitating men’s ability to see the fetus, ultrasound challenges 
women’s privileged access to their own bodily interiors.
However, by contrasting her partner’s expectations about ultrasound 
with her own experience, Interviewee 3 is able to reposition herself as 
having privileged access to the meaning of her pregnancy. Through this 
process, she also contests anti-abortion framings of ultrasound visualiza-
tion as the ultimate “truth” of fetal personhood. Although she invokes this 
framing, she also subverts it by constructing the scan as a process that 
lends moral authority to her decision to end her pregnancy. Moreover, she 
portrays her prior knowledge about this decision as inseparable from her 
encounter with fetal images: “I went into the scan hoping there was no 
heartbeat” and “it just confirms what you already know.”
A similar account was provided by another participant who asked 
spontaneously to look at a picture of her scan during her pre-abortion 
assessment:
I didn’t watch any of it. . . . But then afterwards we went into another room 
to talk about it and I actually asked to see the picture. And it got me on edge 
thinking if I wanted to go through with it or not. But i took everything into 
the picture and I still decided to go through with it.
Siân: Do you know why it was that you wanted to have a look at the picture, 
or?
No. It was just like a little bit of me that in a way wanted to look at it to be 
like, “Sorry,” and a bit to make sure that I did actually want to get rid of it. 
(Interview 4 [emphasis added])
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This participant had previously described the arguments that her preg-
nancy had generated with her partner, which led her to decide that it 
could not continue. As well as portraying ultrasound as a means to test 
and reinforce this decision (taking “everything into the picture”), she 
also offers another depiction of the significance of visual encounters 
with the fetus. Specifically, she describes wanting to acknowledge and 
apologize to her fetus prior to abortion. Similar rationales for viewing 
are also reported in existing studies that have explored women’s 
responses to pre-abortion ultrasound (Graham, Ankrett, and Killick 
2010; Kimport et al. 2012; Wiebe and Adams 2009). However, this lit-
erature does not consider the way in which women’s accounts simulta-
neously invoke and subvert maternal-fetal bonding discourse by 
constructing looking at the fetus as a process of ending (rather than 
beginning) a relationship.
Notably, women interviewed for this study often argued that social 
norms surrounding ultrasound make it difficult to use this technology as a 
means of acknowledging/remembering the fetus:
She asked if I wanted to see it, and after you’ve been through it and you’ve 
got nothing left of what was for me my first child it’s just like I kind of wish 
I’d said, “Yeah, I want to see it,” or “Yeah, I want to know more about it.” 
But I didn’t get to. . . . She said, “We don’t normally show the screens, but 
do you want to?” And obviously I didn’t want my boyfriend to hear me say, 
“Oh yes, I want to see it.” Because that might have upset him as well so I 
was just like, “No, I’d rather not know.” But now I’d kind of rather I did 
know. (Interview 10)
Similar expectations were described in a survey-based study of pre- 
abortion care in England (Graham, Ankrett, and Killick 2010), which found 
that many women wanted to view their ultrasound, but felt unable to ask.
A TEchNOLOGY Of mEDIcAL OBJEcTIfIcATION
In different ways, the accounts considered in the previous section both 
draw upon and “situate” characterizations of ultrasound as a technology 
that involves emotionally significant visual encounters between pregnant 
women and their fetuses. In this section, I use three examples to explore 
an alternative interpretative repertoire through which participants con-
structed the experience of having an ultrasound prior to abortion. I illus-
trate the ways in which participants positioned ultrasound as part of an 
 at University of York on May 4, 2016gas.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
706  GENDER & SOcIETY/October 2015
objectifying medical gaze that produces knowledge about pregnant and 
fetal bodies. Through this repertoire of “medical objectification,” I sug-
gest, ultrasound becomes disconnected from the production of maternal-
fetal relationships and can even be mobilized as a tool of fetal 
de-personification.
participating in a medical Assessment of the pregnant Body
Several participants suggested that because of the way in which ultra-
sound is practiced within abortion clinics, being scanned was a relatively 
unremarkable method of obtaining useful medical knowledge about their 
bodies. For example, one woman presented ultrasound as part of a series of 
medical assessments that helped to facilitate the ending of her pregnancy:
Basically they just checked my details, went through my reasoning for why 
I was having the abortion, and then they said they’d do a blood test and a 
scan just to date the pregnancy, which they just did like a pinprick on my 
finger, and checked my iron levels. And then I had the dating scan and then 
they booked the appointment at [clinic], like, straightaway . . .
Siân: And you said as part of that you had a dating scan. Was that some-
thing that you sort of knew was going to happen or expected?
Yeah, they, the doctor, did tell me they would do that.
Siân: And how did you find—the reason I’m asking is that we don’t know 
much about what it’s like for women to have a scan—if it’s alright, or?
She basically just told me to lay down and that she would push quite hard 
just sort of above my bladder area and that she would turn the screen away 
and turn the sound off so I didn’t hear or see anything. So it literally was 
just like somebody rolling a ball over the, over your tummy, sort of your 
lower tummy area. (Interview 24)
As with several of the accounts considered previously, this participant 
foregrounds her bodily involvement during the scan. However, while 
other participants portrayed their embodied experiences of ultrasound as 
intrinsically connected to visual representations of maternal-fetal bonding 
in popular culture, Interviewee 24 offers a different characterization. She 
suggests that without a viewing screen (or sound), ultrasound is simply “a 
ball rolling over your tummy,” that is, the clinical probing of a pregnant 
woman’s abdomen.
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Engaging in Situated Scientific Spectatorship
Another participant, who chose to watch the viewing monitor, also 
offered an account of ultrasound that contrasts with those considered in 
the previous section. She described the act of viewing the interior of her 
pregnancy as a diagnostic process that rendered the fetus as a separate and 
alien presence within her own body. Far from personifying the fetus, her 
account of her experience of ultrasound locates the fetus as an invading, 
and removable, biological object:
I had to have a scan and she asked me if I wanted to see what she could see? 
She asked me how much info I wanted. And I was really interested at the 
time so I wanted to have a look and she was happy to let me. And she 
explained a lot about the sort of biology, which I was really interested in as 
well. . . . I think it’s quite a funny one because I think in sort of films and 
stuff the first scan is portrayed as if, you know, beautiful, really emotional, 
first time you see the baby, etc. A really kind of pivotal moment. And actu-
ally it wasn’t ever like that in my experience. And I was just kind of inter-
ested about the science. I was like, goodness, that’s what’s inside me. How 
bizarre! And it wasn’t this gorgeous fluffy turning point. It was—and I do, 
I have wondered since if/when I do have children and I do have a scan 
again how differently I’ll feel. Because I’m sure, well, if I do have children 
I’m sure I’ll be emotionally involved [and, you know, rooting for the pro-
cess to work], etc. So I wonder if the scan will be a different process alto-
gether. But for me at that time it was just complete science. It was just 
almost like when the dentist takes a tooth out and says, “Do you want to 
take your tooth home with you?” you know, it was just science and intrigue. 
And there was no emotional attachment. There was no sort of, “Oh gosh, 
now that I see what it is have I made the wrong decision?” None of that at 
all. (Interview 20)
Although this participant describes her experience of ultrasound using an 
interpretative repertoire of medical objectification, her account also 
locates medical objectification as a socially contingent process. 
Significantly, she portrays the construction of a “medical” vision of her 
pregnancy as dependent upon her interactions with the nurse, who nar-
rated the scan using biological discourse. She also emphasizes the social 
context in which she found “the science” fascinating, connecting this to 
her feelings about her pregnancy at that time. Earlier in the interview she 
had described how, on finding out she was pregnant, she knew instantly 
that she did not want to be: Pregnancy was completely unsustainable and 
undesired at that time in her life. Correspondingly, she noted that if the 
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circumstances were different and she wanted to be pregnant, then she 
would expect ultrasound to be a very different experience.
Being “Early”: medical Objectification as moral Resource
Interviewee 20 (above) suggests that the objectifying possibilities of 
ultrasound are dependent upon the social context of the particular preg-
nancy in which one is invited to participate in a “scientific” account of its 
meaning. However, other participants mobilized this repertoire very dif-
ferently, suggesting that the medical knowledge produced by ultrasound 
can determine the meaning of being pregnant:
They couldn’t do the ultrasound on the stomach. . . . They had to do it 
through the vagina because it was [literally] they couldn’t pick up anything. 
And so she confirmed it as six weeks and five days. . . . It was better than 
a Pap smear or anything, really. It was just—that was fine. Like, I didn’t 
want to look at the thing that she was—look at the monitor. But not a big 
deal, I just sort of, yeah, it really was fine. And then maybe even doing that 
made me feel like, you know, if I was having an ultrasound on my stomach, 
I don’t know, just from movies and everything, I might have felt like it 
was—I sort of almost preferred that it was that way because it didn’t feel 
as, um, as what you’d expect an ultrasound to be like for pregnancy. Do you 
know what I mean? Like, I just sort of felt like if it was on my stomach I’d 
feel like I was, like, someone off TV getting a . . . you know. It would have 
felt a bit too . . . I don’t know, it just, it did make me feel better but also 
that, you know, it was so small and so new that it couldn’t even come up 
like that. Like, I think definitely the period of time did seem to have an 
impact on me. . . . I wonder whether I would have . . . any longer I would 
have felt worse. But because it was so early and that, yeah, I sort of, I did 
feel better that it wasn’t. You know, the people outside had those things, 
like, showing what eight or nine weeks or something looked like, and if I’d 
been on the dot of what the posters there were showing or, you know what 
I mean, [that might] actually. But I knew that it wasn’t that far progressed. 
(Interview 23)
Echoing many elements of the accounts considered previously, this par-
ticipant suggests that simply “not looking” is insufficient to disrupt the 
normative sociotechnical script of ultrasound. She links particular sets of 
practices to expectations about what ultrasound “should” be like in preg-
nancy, and highlights the way these expectations are entrenched in the 
visual culture of film and television. However, she also sets up a series of 
contrasts between these expectations and her own experience. Conducted 
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vaginally, rather than via the abdomen, ultrasound becomes a different 
kind of practice entirely. As well as disrupting an anticipated sensory 
experience, the vaginal scan objectifies the participant’s pregnancy as 
literally invisible: It is simply too “small and . . . new” to be seen and 
dated using conventional medical methods. In turn, this enables her to 
contest the anti-abortion framing of the meaning of her pregnancy that she 
describes encountering (in the form of protestors wielding posters depict-
ing fetal development) outside of the clinic. Ultrasound offers “objective” 
evidence that her pregnancy does not resemble those that are the focus of 
anti-abortion protest.
However, this account also highlights the ambiguous resource provided 
by a repertoire of medical objectification. Un-situated deployments of this 
repertoire suggest that the meaning of pregnancy is defined by ultrasound 
measurements, as opposed to pregnant women’s knowledge of their 
embodied social circumstances. Constructed in this way, the same tool of 
medical dating that defines Interviewee 23’s pregnancy as developmen-
tally “insignificant” has the capacity to position other women’s pregnan-
cies very differently.
cONcLUSION
Feminist theory has countered anti-abortion portrayals of ultrasound 
images as “objective” evidence of fetal personhood by deconstructing 
such depictions, offering alternative readings of these images, and empha-
sizing the plurality of ultrasound across different contexts of its use. This 
article has contributed to this project through an analysis of women’s 
accounts of a context of pregnant embodiment that has been neglected by 
existing feminist research concerning ultrasound. In this concluding dis-
cussion I summarize the ways in which my engagement with women’s 
accounts of ultrasound prior to abortion contributes to feminist under-
standings of this technology.
A key concern within feminist writing about ultrasound is that pregnant 
women are erased from ultrasound images (Petchesky 1987), facilitating 
“fetal-centred” (Steinberg 1991, 179) discussion of abortion. However, 
Roberts (2012b) illustrates that in some contexts, it is possible to gener-
ate alternative representations of ultrasound that foreground pregnant 
women’s bodily involvement (see also Palmer 2009a). This possibility 
is likewise highlighted by this study. As my analysis has illustrated, 
several participants described ultrasound as providing visual, or other, 
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information about their own bodies. Others positioned their bodily 
involvement as central to the generation of ultrasound images. In particu-
lar, women talked about feeling the probe gel being placed on their abdo-
men, feeling the probe pushing into their abdomen, or discovering that a 
probe had to be inserted into their vagina in order to visualize their uterus.
The depiction of pregnant subjects as central to the practice of ultra-
sound was a cross-cutting feature of participants’ accounts and represents 
one key way in which the interview data could be said to destabilize 
dominant depictions of the technology. However, I have also argued that 
participants employed two distinct interpretative repertoires in describing 
their experiences, each of which poses other challenges to narrow 
accounts of ultrasound’s meaning. In the case of the repertoire of medical 
objectification, participants portrayed ultrasound as a tool of medical 
knowledge production de-coupled from processes of fetal personification. 
Drawing on this repertoire, participants described ultrasound as an oppor-
tunity to satisfy scientific curiosity about biological events taking place 
inside their bodies, as one of a series of medical assessments to which 
their own bodies needed to be subjected to enable their abortion, and as 
evidence that the embryo/fetus within their bodies was developmentally 
and morally insignificant. All such depictions represent a radical depar-
ture from the characterization of ultrasound as an experience of “mater-
nal-fetal bonding.”
These findings resonate with cross-cultural research concerning pre-
natal ultrasound, which highlights that this technology is not always 
linked to the personification of the fetus. Rather, in many contexts, ultra-
sound is primarily a medical tool used to objectify maternal/fetal bodies 
and generate knowledge about the “viability” (and potential nonviability) 
of a pregnancy (Gammeltoft 2007; Mitchell and Georges 1997; Morgan 
2000). However, this article also extends existing studies by illustrating 
that in the context of abortion care, the repertoire of ultrasound as medi-
cal objectification can become actively enrolled in projects of fetal de- 
personification.
At the same time, I have suggested that unsituated uses of the repertoire 
of medical objectification provide an ambiguous resource to women who 
decide to end their pregnancies. Women can deploy ultrasound’s objecti-
fication of the fetus as evidence of its developmental—and moral—insig-
nificance, if the technology locates their pregnancy as sufficiently “early.” 
Simultaneously, however, this constructs the meaning of pregnancy as 
defined by medical measurements of fetal development, as opposed to 
pregnant women’s knowledge of their embodied social circumstances. 
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This assumption is central to the regulation of abortion in England, 
Scotland, and Wales, and has underpinned attempts to restrict women’s 
access to abortion at later gestations of pregnancy (Palmer 2009b; Science 
and Technology Subgroup 1991; Sheldon 1997).
The other interpretative repertoire that participants drew on to charac-
terize experiences of ultrasound contrasts strikingly with the repertoire of 
medical objectification. Using a repertoire of “situated visual relation-
ships,” participants depicted ultrasound as a site at which emotionally 
significant, yet socially specific, visual encounters between pregnant 
women and their fetuses take place. In doing so, they challenged the “con-
flation of seeing with knowing” (Palmer 2009b, 174) that is central to 
anti-abortion rhetoric, and offered representations of ultrasound as some-
thing other than an experience of maternal-fetal bonding. For example, 
some women suggested that ultrasound evokes visualizations of joyful 
maternity but rejected this sociotechnical script as incompatible with their 
own feelings about their pregnancies. Others described engaging in emo-
tionally significant visual encounters with their fetuses prior to abortion, 
but subverted anti-abortion depictions of the meaning of this process. 
They argued that their decisions to end their pregnancies were reinforced 
through witnessing the “reality” of their fetuses, and also emphasized the 
way in which this reality was constructed through their own prior knowl-
edge about the meaning of their pregnancies. Similarly, other participants 
suggested that when the decision has been made to end a pregnancy, ultra-
sound can represent a means of articulating the loss, or ending, of a rela-
tionship—rather than signifying its beginning.
However, while participants did challenge depictions of ultrasound as 
an experience of joyful maternal spectatorship, their use of the reper-
toire of situated visual relationships was nonetheless oriented to this 
dominant portrayal of ultrasound’s meaning. This orientation was like-
wise visible when women drew on a repertoire of medical objectifica-
tion, which was often used to construct contrasts with popular portrayals 
of ultrasound. The difficulties involved in generating alternative accounts 
of this sociotechnical practice were stated explicitly by several partici-
pants. For example, women who chose not to look at the viewing screen 
drew attention to the lack of representation of their experiences within 
visual culture. They argued that in film and television, ultrasound is 
depicted as a moment of joyful maternal-fetal bonding, excluding the 
possibility that this technology, as well as women’s pregnancies, might 
hold very different meanings. Relatedly, other participants highlighted 
the difficulties involved in pursuing visual encounters with the fetus 
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that transgress normative expectations about the basis of these encoun-
ters (i.e., that they might involve acknowledging the loss of a relation-
ship rather than joyfully anticipating its development). Collectively, 
their accounts highlight the importance of changing the stories about 
ultrasound and pregnancy that “get to travel” (Taylor 2008, 14), and 
suggest that one way feminist research could facilitate this process 
would be to expand empirical analyses of this technology to encompass 
its use during abortion provision.
NOTES
1. Any attempt to reify dichotomous “categories” of pregnancy is problematic, 
because (as participants in my study attest) the meaning of pregnancy can alter 
over time. In this article, I construct a pragmatic distinction between “pregnancies 
that women plan to carry to term” and “pregnancies that women decide to termi-
nate,” while acknowledging that the former sometimes become the latter, and 
vice versa. I use these descriptive terms in order to avoid characterizing pregnan-
cies in more normative terms as either “wanted” or “unwanted’’ (although I do 
use this language in situations when it is employed by participants themselves). 
Research indicates that the terms wanted/unwanted are often regarded as prob-
lematic by women who terminate their pregnancies: Pregnancies may be “wanted” 
but simultaneously impossible (Barrett and Wellings 2002). For this reason, I 
have also avoided characterizations of women as “willingly”/“unwillingly” preg-
nant (as used by Hopkins, Zeedyk, and Raitt [2005] in their analysis of antiabor-
tion discourse): A woman may be “willingly” pregnant, but unable to continue 
with her pregnancy.
2. The proportions vary between studies.
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